



Die Beiträge in diesem Heft werden in einem konzeptionellen Rahmen zusammengeführt, 
der dem anhaltenden Gewicht des Eurozentrismus entgegenwirkt, indem er auf langfristige 
Konnektivitäten und Gemeinsamkeiten in Eurasien aufmerksam macht. Dazu werden Ansätze 
auf Makro- und Mikroebene vorgestellt und maritime wie terrestrische Kommunikationsnetze 
und verschiedene Formen der politischen Gesellschaft untersucht – von den Agrarimperien 
der Antike bis zur heutigen Volksrepublik China. Die Autoren, die mehrere Nationalitäten und 
theoretische Traditionen vertreten, arbeiten in den Bereichen der Sozialanthropologie, der Area 
Studies, der Geschichtswissenschaft und der (historischen und politischen) Soziologie.
Presenting both macro- and micro-level approaches, exploring maritime as well as terrestrial 
networks of communication, and investigating diverse forms of political society from the agrar-
ian empires of the ancient world to the People’s Republic of China in our era, the essays in this 
special issue are brought together in a frame that counters the continuing weight of Eurocen-
trism by drawing attention to long-term connectivities and commonalities across Eurasia. The 
authors (representing multiple nationalities and theoretical traditions) work in Social Anthro-
pology, Area Studies, History and (Historical and Political) Sociology. 
1 This Special Issue derives from a panel at the Fifth European Congress on World and Global History (Budapest, 31 
August – 3 September 2017). Our title was “Empires, exchange and civilizational connectivity in Eurasia”. Dagmar 
Schäfer was among the presenters but was unable to write up her paper for this issue. We are delighted that 
Jack Goldstone was able to come on board to round off the set. My thanks to all authors for patiently revising 
their papers for this publication. 
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The world of the early twenty-first century is still very much in thrall to the idea of 
sovereign nation-states. However illusionary this state model, given the entanglements 
of political economy, the consolidation of supra-national organizations, and massive 
power differentials, it remains entrenched. The nation-state is the hallmark of indus-
trial modernity, in the same way that empire is taken to be the archetypal form of 
what Ernest Gellner theorized as the Agrarian Age. Gellner’s philosophy of history 
has a materialist foundation, but the new order has a distinct emotional dimension in 
unprecedented forms of collective belonging. Whereas Agraria was characterized by 
complex multiculturalism, Industria creates homogenized linguistic and cultural units 
that have to be (for the efficient functioning of an industrial society) “congruent” with 
the political units.2 
As the continuing interest in Geller’s oeuvre indicates, these ideal types have been pro-
ductive. But they have been found wanting in numerous respects. One complaint is that 
the genesis and dissemination of nationalism does not correlate well with the rise of in-
dustrialism. Another is that Gellner exaggerates the homogeneity of the nation-state and 
fails to deal with the new forms of migration and cultural diversity that seem endemic 
to mature Industria. New forms of imperialism have emerged in the wake of the formal 
dissolution of both “continental” and “overseas” empires in the course of the twenti-
eth century, but Gellner does not investigate these, or their relation to global political 
economy. As a characterization of several thousand years of human history, the model of 
Agraria is similarly deficient. Can Gellner’s favourite examples, the Ottoman Empire and 
the Habsburg Empire, really stand for empire everywhere, e.g. in East Asia? What about 
the many communities that did not practise any form of agriculture and were hardly 
integrated into the empires at all?3
Historians and anthropologists looking to grasp the contours of human history in more 
precise and comprehensive ways than Ernest Gellner evidently need more conceptual 
tools to do so. One helpful tool-box is that offered by historical sociologist Johann P. 
Arnason.4 Building especially on Marcel Mauss’s seminal theorizing of civilisation as a 
“family of societies”, Arnason argues that civilizations are fluid macro social formations 
that are found throughout human history. Civilization is, of course, a problematic term 
due to the baggage it has accumulated, from the Enlightenment binaries that opposed 
“us” to savages, to contemporary notions of a liberal Christian Europe versus its multitu-
dinous enemies. Most historians and social scientists have ignored it. This is particularly 
2 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Oxford 1983. See also Gellner, Plough, Sword and Book. The Structure 
of Human History, London 1988.
3 The scholarly literature on empires is vast and rapidly expanding. Major recent contributions include Krishan 
Kumar, Visions of Empire. How Five Imperial Regimes Shaped the World, Princeton 2017; Hans-Heinrich Nolte, 
Kurze Geschichte der Imperien, Wien 2017. Nolte specifies rigorous criteria for recognizing an empire and covers 
altogether fourteen imperial or quasi-imperial polities. The USA is classified as a “globale Nation” rather than an 
“Imperium”. Nolte has little to say concerning the European Union, though this polity is nowadays vigorously 
critiqued as a “liberal empire” by some of its own citizens (notably the Prime Minister of Hungary, Viktor Orbán).
4 Johann P. Arnason, Civilizations in Dispute: Historical Questions and Theoretical Traditions, Leiden 2003. Johann 
P. Arnason and Chris Hann (eds.), Anthropology and Civilizational Analysis: Eurasian Explorations, Albany 2018.
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true of German scholarship, due to the continuing legacy of the binary that opposes 
Zivilisation to Kultur.5
Yet the concept of civilization is potentially helpful in accounting for the rise and decline 
of Eurasian agrarian empires, discussed in this Special Issue by Krishan Kumar. The pas-
toral nomads of the steppe represent another type of civilization, but, as Marie Favereau 
stresses in the following contribution, the case of the Mongols can only be grasped in 
terms of their intimate connections with sedentary neighbours. This particular civiliza-
tional encounter was evidently conducive both to enhanced trade across the Eurasian 
landmass and substantial intra-civilizational economic transformations. It is a similar 
story in the Indian Ocean World explored by Burkhard Schnepel. For many centuries, 
and again in own era, civilizational boundaries in this vast region reflected the expansion 
of Chinese influence. The interaction of Europeans and Asians which followed the mari-
time expansion of the West can also be fruitfully approached through Arnason’s language 
of civilizational encounters. The micro-level study by Ildikó Bellér-Hann shows that the 
oasis of Qumul is a Silk Road hub where different civilizations have overlapped during 
millennia (in recent centuries primarily those of China and Islam). Finally, though he 
uses the term culture rather than civilization, in his contribution Jack Goldstone shows 
how consciousness of imperial traditions influences the power holders who are managing 
the rejuvenation of China that is unfolding in the twenty-first century.
I discuss civilizational analysis in more depth in the paper that follows. Adding the di-
mension of civilization helps to correct the inadequacy of a model that theorizes moder-
nity in terms of the transition from empires to nation-states. But it is also necessary to 
address the geographical imagination that assigns both to “continents”. When problems 
arise in doing so, not only with Alexander the Great but also in more recent centuries 
in the case of Russia, instead of questioning the notion of continent (a relatively recent 
artefact of Western Eurasian historical writing), we tend to say that the Russian Empire 
and its successors (including the present Federation) straddle two continents. But the 
history of the Eurasian landmass in recent millennia does not support the binary that 
opposes Europe to Asia. 
In the opening paper I elaborate a multidisciplinary approach that synthesizes the per-
spectives of Jack Goody (especially concerning “alternating leadership” between East and 
West) and Karl Polanyi (who offers the tools to analyse a very long-run dialectic of 
market exchange and redistribution). I begin with the concept of Eurasia, which has 
not been adequately theorized hitherto and is frequently used ideologically. I argue that 
attention to the common characteristics and connectivity of Eurasian civilizations is an 
indispensable corrective to the Western Eurasian (European) bias that has infected so 
much historiography, including that of the social sciences since their inception. Main-
stream accounts (at least in the Euro-American narratives) of world history have long 
been constructed on the premise of a breakthrough in Europe. Ernest Gellner was one of 
5 Norbert Elias, Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation. Soziogenetische und psychogenetische Untersuchungen, 2 vols, 
Basel 1939 (second edition1969).
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many scholars who subscribed to the notion of a “European miracle.”6 Towards the end 
of the twentieth century, when the club of wealthy, successfully modernizing East Asian 
states was joined by the People’s Republic of China, the Eurocentrism of the dominant 
narratives began to be questioned.7 Alternative models with quite different spatial and 
temporal characteristics were put forward. The pendulum continues to swing: in recent 
years, it is possible to detect a “pushing back” against those accused of belittling the 
unique contributions of Europe.8
The dust has not yet settled on these debates and perhaps it never will. A satisfactory 
account of human history will need to combine investigations of socio-economic condi-
tions (including demographic variables and labour productivity) with analysis of ideas 
and ideologies, including religions. Universal history aspires to transcend the particular 
contexts of its genesis and does not flatten out important sources of difference. But later 
analysts will always seek to disentangle the local roots of even the most ambitious at-
tempts to grasp the general and the universal. For the purposes of theorizing Eurasia, the 
most pertinent body of literature is that which has become known as Axial Age theory. 
I assess the debates surrounding this concept and its prominent place in civilizational 
analysis in my paper below.
My argument concludes by considering an alternative binary to that which celebrates the 
achievements of Western Europe and its offshoot in North America vis-à-vis the East and 
the rest of the world. Instead of “the West versus the rest”, I suggest that the old dichoto-
my “old world versus new world” might offer a better understanding of the dilemmas of 
our moment in history. When President Donald Trump shuts down his government and 
(in his 2019 State of the Union address) rails against “socialism” as being incompatible 
with the values of the American people, he is rhetorically positioning himself (cleverly 
and effectively, in the eyes of seasoned commentators) for the next presidential election 
in 2020. At the same time, he is drawing attention to oceanic chasms, because the blatant 
denigration of government and ideals of collective responsibility and solidarity is hardly 
conceivable in the rooted civilizational traditions of either Western or Eastern Eurasia. 
Of course, other states of the New World are much closer to endorsing the models that 
have evolved in the Old World; it is not inconceivable that they will eventually prevail 
in the USA. But nor is it inconceivable that an individualist, pro-market nexus, punctu-
ated by phases of populist protectionism, will undermine the solidarities which evolved 
to contain libertarian impulses in the Old World. In this precarious contest, it is all 
6 Eric L. Jones, The European Miracle. Environments, Economies, and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, 
Cambridge 1981; John A. Hall and Jean Baechler (eds.), Europe and the Rise of Capitalism, Oxford 1988.
7 Andre Gunder Frank and Barry K. Gills (eds.), The World System. Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?, London / 
New York 1993; Jack Goody, The East in the West, Cambridge 1996; André Gunder Frank, ReOrient: Global Econ-
omy in the Asian Age, Berkeley 1998; Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great Divergence. China, Europe, and the Making 
of the Modern World Economy, Princeton 2000; Jack Goldstone, Why Europe?, New York 2008.
8 Peer Vries, Via Peking back to Manchester: Britain, the Industrial Revolution, and China, Leiden 2003; Ian Morris, 
Why the West Rules – For Now: The Patterns of History and What They Reveal about the Future, New York 2010; 
Jürgen Kocka and Marcel Van der Linden (eds.), Capitalism. The Reemergence of a Historical Concept, London 
2016.
Recognizing Eurasia | 11
the more important to recognize commonalities across the civilizational pluralism of 
Eurasia. At present the contrast to the USA is starkly evident on issues such as climate 
accords, universal health care and pensions, not to mention access to weapons for the 
citizenry. But the most important challenge is responsible regulation of the economy and 
world trade in the interests of social justice and planetary stewardship.    
The issue continues with a wide-ranging overview of empires by historical sociolo-
gist Krishan Kumar, who emphasizes the aspirations to “universalism” that distinguish 
(world) empires from other types of political community. The enduring exemplar is that 
of Alexander the Great. We owe most of what we know about Alexander to the Romans, 
but of course his empire was not limited to the eastern Mediterranean. Alexander con-
quered and tried to integrate the Achaemenid Persian Empire, he was a reference point 
for Mauryan India, later for the entire Muslim world, and even for those Europeans 
who reached the Orient by maritime routes. Noting not only the spatial connectivities 
that resulted from commercial and military encounters but also the complex temporal 
continuities through which imperial social orders are reproduced, Kumar concludes that 
we can speak of “a continuous experience of empire across the entire Eurasian landmass” 
since the Axial Age. 
The empires explored by Kumar are familiar to us in the sense that they represent forms 
of “high culture” based on literate, sedentarized populations with large cities and com-
plex divisions of craft labour. Not all Eurasian empires conformed to such a model. 
Historian Marie Favereau explores the steppe empire created by Chinggis Khan and 
maintained over a century by his descendants. She shows that it is erroneous to approach 
the century-long Mongol Peace with the paradigm (contentious with reference to its 
primary object) of Pax Romana. Rather, Favereau invites us to begin with the distinctive 
concepts and cosmology of the Mongols themselves, in order to grasp how the expan-
sion of trade in “luxury” items fed into redistribution and the reproduction of status 
hierarchy in Mongol society. Both foreign and Mongol merchants were supported by the 
khans and their administrations at multiple levels. Merchants were granted access to the 
yam network of communications and incentivized to settle permanently in new ports 
of trade. When maritime links to China via the Persian Gulf became problematic due 
to the decline of the port of Tabriz, in the 1330s the Venetians responded by accepting 
the initiatives of the Jochid khan and further developing the northern, terrestrial route. 
While long distance trade between China and Europe was the ultimate goal of many 
merchants, Favereau shows that the institutional supports created by the Mongol rulers 
were simultaneously conducive to commerce on more modest local and regional scales 
throughout this Eurasian space. 
If the steppe lands to the north played a key role in the intensification of connectiv-
ity across Eurasia, so too did “seaborne empires” to the south. Social anthropologist 
Burkhard Schnepel, engaging with the interdisciplinary field of Indian Ocean Studies, 
reminds us of the importance of Chinese explorers, diplomats and traders (above all 
Admiral Zheng He in the early fifteenth century). The Western Europeans who arrived 
on the scene later misrecognized the “polycentric” political systems they encountered 
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in South Asia. The port cities of the Srivajaya empire (Malacca Straits) were a notable 
example, more akin to the Hanseatic League than to a centralized European monarchy. 
Schnepel analyses these cities as hubs in dense networks of “connectivity in motion,” 
both in relation to each other and to their respective hinterlands. He goes on to illustrate 
“the art of hubbing” on the island of Mauritius, where he has conducted long-term field 
research. After deconstructing the “ethnic” categories conventionally used to denote col-
lective identities, Schnepel concludes at the level of “individual and family hubbing” 
with a close-up analysis of continuity and change among Franco-Mauritians since the 
late eighteenth century.  
Ildikó Bellér-Hann brings us back to the heart of terrestrial Eurasia with her case study 
from the Silk Road oasis of Qumul (Chinese: Hami) in what today is the Xinjiang 
Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China. This Silk Road hub 
lies at the boundary between sedentary agriculturalists and the steppe to the north. Of 
greater significance for Bellér-Hann is its location on an east-west boundary. Qumul is 
positioned at the extreme eastern edge of the Turkic-Muslim world. A Muslim dynasty 
maintained a degree of autonomy from the expansive Chinese empire until 1930, but 
contemporary elites are obliged to construct regional and ethnic identities within the 
dual constraints of socialist ideology and Beijing’s concerns over Uyghur secessionism. 
The indigenous narratives extracted by Bellér-Hann from a recently published biographi-
cal dictionary of “outstanding personalities” of the oasis make little use of Silk Road im-
agery and do not invoke grand geostrategic projects. Bellér-Hann shows, however, that 
the subjects treated are deeply embedded in transregional and transnational networks. 
Methodologically the analysis of these life-histories constitutes an original example of re-
lational history, in which grand narratives, whether of the kind proffered by Jack Goody 
or by nationalist politicians in the reform era of the PRC, are connected to the level 
of metis and the perspectives of local actors. These biographical texts offer rich seams 
of data concerning tradition, stability and social change in a province that is currently 
subject to extraordinary repressive measures, apparently designed to ensure the definitive 
assimilation of the Uyghurs into the Chinese nation-state.
Jack Goldstone concludes the issue with an assessment of how the present rulers of 
this polity are endeavouring to restore its traditional standing as the “middle kingdom”, 
central to trade and politics not just in Eurasia but in the world. The Belt and Road 
Initiative of President Xi Jinping is a massive investment programme with military and 
geostrategic as well as economic and technological implications for the planet. It pro-
claims distinctive messages, which can be interpreted as forms of “soft power” (exempli-
fied by Confucius Institutes) that contradict the assumptions of Euro-American liberal 
social science. According to Goldstone, imperial China was never the monolithic politi-
cal unity that the West frequently imagined it to be. But while the old dynastic empire 
proved incapable of meeting modern challenges in the nineteenth century, now, in the 
twenty-first century, the communist-led nation-state is well on the way to confirming 
the validity of Jack Goody’s long-term model of alternating leadership. These processes 
are currently transforming the life worlds of ethnic minority citizens in cities such as 
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Qumul / Hami, discussed in the paper by Bellér-Hann. What this new phase of Chinese 
hegemony or world empire (without the hyphen) might mean for the planet in the era 
of the Anthropocene (also known as the Capitalocene but perhaps, as I shall argue, best 
viewed as the Eurasiacene) remains to be seen.  
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